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The Aftermath of Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado: What is Left of the Business
Judgment Rule?
Michael Morris*
Robert J. Henry**
I. Introduction
The business judgment rule evolved to enable competent people
to serve as fiduciaries without the potential of liability arising from a
mistake of judgment or an unpopular business decision.. The genesis
of this doctrine is the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Percy
v. Millaudon,' in which the court ruled:
[T]he occurrence of difficulties . . . which offer only a choice of
measures, the adoption of a course from which loss ensues cannot make the [director] responsible, if the error was one into
which a prudent man might have fallen ...[T]he test of responsibility therefore should be not the certainty of wisdom in
others, but the possession of ordinary knowledge, and by showing that the error of the [director] is of so gross a kind that a
man of common sense and ordinary attention would not have
fallen into it.8
The business judgment rule applies to cases in which a decision
of a board of directors is attacked as a breach of the directors' duty.
Under the rule, the court reviews only the due care, good faith, and
independence of the directors. The court does not review the correct* B.A. 1978, Holy Cross College; J.D. 1984, Delaware Law School; LL.M. (Taxation)
1985, Georgetown University School of Law; Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
** Assistant Professor, Delaware Law School; B.S. 1973, Mercy College of Detroit; J.D.
1976, Wayne State University; LL.M. (Corporations) 1977, New York University School of
Law; LL.M. (Taxation) 1978, New York University School of Law; Member, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and New Jersey Bars.
1. Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 96 (1979).
2. Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829).
3.

Id. at 77-78. See Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder

Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW 27 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Block &
Prussin].

ness of the decision of the board." The rule serves several purposes.
First, it encourages qualified people to become directors by assuring
that the standard of care expected of them will be commensurate
with, but no greater than, the degree of care which they would exercise in the management of their own business affairs.0 Second, on the
rationale that the shareholders themselves selected the directors to
manage the business's affairs, the rule enables courts to refuse to
substitute its judgment for that of the directors. Finally, it prevents
the courts from becoming enmeshed in complex corporate decisions
beyond the scope of their expertise.7
The business judgment rule has been used by corporations both
"offensively" and "defensively." When utilized defensively, the directors' objective is to shield their judgment from judicial scrutiny,
thereby protecting themselves from conjecture regarding the rationality of their decision. A corporation uses the business judgment rule
offensively when, confronted by the possibility of a shareholder derivative suit, its board of directors makes a business judgment to designate a special litigation committee to press the corporation's claim.
This enables the corporation to retain control of a lawsuit rather
than allowing shareholders to preside over the matter.'
Most of the present litigation containing issues about shareholder derivative suits involve compliance with the demand requirement imposed by Rule 23.1 of the Delaware Court of Chancery.'
This rule requires a plaintiff to meet certain criteria before that
plaintiff can bring a shareholder derivative action. First, the shareholder must demonstrate that he was actually a shareholder at the
time of the transaction complained of. Second, the shareholder must
describe either his efforts to demand the board to bring suit on behalf of the corporation, or the specific reasons for his failure to make
10
a demand on the board.
4. Kaplan v. Centrex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971).
5. Note, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, A Middle Ground When Applying the Business
Judgment Rule to the Termination of Derivative Suits, 31 CATH. U.L. REv. 539 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Note, A Middle Ground].
6. Note, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, Delaware's Judicial Business Judgment Rule A Ship Without a Rudder?, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 189, 192 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Delaware's Judicial Business Judgment Rule].
7. Block & Prussin, supra note 3, at 33. The authors further contend that the business
judgment rule serves the purpose of giving the directors broad discretion. This broad discretion
is necessary to formulate dynamic and effective corporate policy without fear of judicial second
guessing.
8. Id. at 38.
9. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1, DEL. CODE ANN. Vol. 16 (1974).
10. Bergstein v. Texas Int'l Co., 453 A.2d 467, 470 (Del. Ch. 1982). The court followed Chancellor Seitz's opinion in Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 103, 174 A.2d 696
(1961), which stated that demand is futile if the directors approved, ratified, or participated in

the fraudulent actions, thus making it unrealistic for the directors to seek action against themselves. The court ruled that in such a situation demand would be futile.

More specifically, the shareholder desiring to pursue a derivative suit is presented with two alternatives to satisfy the demand requirement.11 One alternative is for the shareholder to demand that
the corporation act on his specific complaint. In this procedure, the
board of directors examines the matter; but if the directors are
named as defendants or are alleged to have been involved in the
wrongdoing, then they may form a special litigation committee to
investigate the shareholder's claims. The independent committee has
the power to decide whether or not to proceed with the litigation
based on the corporation's best interests." If the independent committee decides not to prosecute the claims, the shareholder may file
suit alleging that the corporation has a cause of action and that the
board of directors has wrongfully refused to prosecute the action.
The court's standard of review in this situation is the business judgement rule.13
The second manner in which a shareholder can satisfy the demand requirement is for the shareholder to show that he is excused
from making demand on the board of directors due to the involvement or participation of directors in the matter complained of, thus
making the demand futile." In this instance, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint specific facts which justify why the demand
should be excused. 5 The corporation, in response to the request for
the demand to be excused, usually appoints a special litigation committee to determine a course of action." After the committee's investigation, it may make a motion for dismissal of the shareholder's
derivative action. The special litigation committee's right to terminate a shareholder's derivative action has been addressed by the
highest courts of both New York and Delaware, with different tests
applied in each state. 7
II. Background
The New York Court of Appeals was the first highest state
court to address the issue of whether a special litigation committee,
appointed by the board and consisting of several board members, has
the power to terminate a shareholder action brought against the
other directors. 18 In Auerbach v. Bennett, 9 the court phrased the
11.

DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1, DEL. CODE ANN. Vol. 16 (1974).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(c) (1974).
13. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981).
14. Bergstein v. Texas Int'l Co., 453 A.2d 467, 470 (Del. Ch. 1982).
15. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1, DEL. CODE ANN. Vol. 16 (1974).
16. Block & Prussin, supra note 3.
17. The leading case in New York is Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d
994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 926 (1979). The leading authority in Delaware is Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
18. Block & Prussin, supra note 3, at 45.

12.

issue as follows:
In the present case we confront a special instance of the application of the business judgment rule and inquire whether it applies
in its full vigor to shield from judicial scrutiny the decision of a
three person minority committee of the board acting on behalf
of the full board not to prosecute a shareholder derivative
action.20
In Auerbach, shareholder Auerbach initiated the suit upon
learning of an internal committee's investigation which showed that
eleven million dollars had been paid to persons in foreign countries
in the form of bribes and kickbacks by four present board members.2 After commencement of the suit, the board of directors appointed a special litigation committee to investigate Auerbach's
claim that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty. The committee concluded that it would be in the best interest of the corporation not to pursue the litigation.2 2 The New York Court of Appeals
granted the special litigation committee's motion to dismiss.2 3
Auerbach did not appeal, whereupon another shareholder, Wallenstein, moved to become a co-plaintiff in order to proceed with the
appeal.24 The corporation then moved to appeal the decision which
had allowed Wallenstein to be included as a co-plaintiff. 5 After certifying Wallenstein as a co-plaintiff, the court promulgated the test

to be applied to the special litigation committee's recommendation of
dismissal:
While the substantive aspects of a decision to terminate a share-

holder's derivative action against defendant corporate directors
made by a committee of disinterested directors are beyond judicial inquiry under the business judgment doctrine, the court may
inquire as to the disinterested independence of the members of
that committee and as to the appropriateness and sufficiency of
the investigative procedures chosen and pursued by the
committee.2 6

In reviewing, the special litigation committee's investigation, the
19. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
20. Id. at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
21. Id. at 624-25, 393 N.E.2d at 996-97, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922-23.
22. Id. at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923. The committee concluded
that none of the directors had personally profited from the activity and that if the shareholder's motion was allowed to proceed, it would detract from the corporation's management
in both time and talent on a suit that was not in the best interests of the corporation.
23. Id. at 626, 393 N.E.2d at 998, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
24. Id. at 626, 393 N.E.2d at 998, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
25. Id. at 626, 393 N.E.2d at 998, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
26. Id. at 623-24, 393 N.E.2d at 996, 419 N.Y.S. 2d at 922.

court determined that the committee's action consisted of two components. The first was the committee's selection of procedures for
investigating the shareholder's claim. The second component was the
committee's ultimate substantive decision. 7 The court concluded
that the second component of the committee's function was within
the confines of the business judgment rule and was not reviewable by
the court.2 8 The first component, however, consisting of the committee's methodologies and procedures, could and would be judicially
scrutinized. 9 The court then considered whether the shareholder had
met his burden of proof to show the inadequacy and inappropriateness of the committee's methodologies and procedures.3 0 The court
held that the shareholder failed to meet this burden, and consequently dismissed the suit.38
Auerbach became the benchmark decision on the issues of the
power of a special litigation committee consisting of disinterested directors to terminate an action against the other directors, and the
proper standard of review. 2 The progeny of Auerbach, however, did
not produce a consensus in these matters. Moreover, the decision in
Zapata Corporation v. Maldonado" confused the issues even
further.
In Zapata, the board of directors adopted a stock option plan in
which the Zapata officers and directors were granted options to
purchase Zapata stock at $12.15 in five consecutive installments
with the last one being exercised on July 14, 1974.1" At the time the
last stock option had to be exercised, Zapata was planning a tender
offer to purchase 2,300,000 shares of its own stock.36 The directors,
realizing the price of the stock would rise after the tender offer,
sought to avoid additional federal income tax liability by accelerating the option date.3
27. Id. at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
28. Id. at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29. The court ruled that it
would not inquire into which factors the committee considered or the relative weight accorded
to them by the committee in reaching its substantive decision. See supra note 4.
29. 47 N.Y.2d at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The court concluded
that it was more qualified than the corporate directors to determine the committee's procedures and methodologies because of its vast experience in these areas.
30. Id. at 635, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
31. Id. at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929-30. In dismissing the shareholder's motion, the court noted that the committee had engaged highly competent counsel to
assist in the investigation and had reviewed the work of a prior internal audit committee which
had addressed the same subject matter. Also, the committee had interviewed the people involved in the allegedly questionable payments in consultation with outside counsel and thereafter decided that it was best not to pursue the action.
32. Block & Prussin, supra note 3, at 45.
33. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
34. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1254 (Del. Ch. 1980), revd in part, 430 A.2d
779 (Del. 1981).
35. Id. at 1254.
36. Id.

Maldonado, a shareholder, brought suit alleging that the acceleration of the option date by the directors was a breach of their
fiduciary duty. 7 The corporation, four years after commencement of
the suit, appointed an independent investigation committee consisting of two outside directors. 88 After its investigation, the committee
moved to dismiss the action on the ground that continuation of the
suit would be contrary to the corporation's best interests. 9 The Delaware Court of Chancery denied the corporation's motion to dismiss,
ruling that a shareholder possesses an independent right to redress
an alleged wrong even though the 40special litigation committee has
recommended dismissal of the suit.
While the suit claiming a breach of fiduciary duty was being
pursued, another suit against the corporation, also brought by Maldonado, was pending in federal court alleging security law violations."1 Again, the special committee moved to dismiss the action on
behalf of the corporation. The federal court granted Zapata's motion
for dismissal based on the business judgment rule because the committee consisted of independent disinterested directors. The shareholder appealed this decision to the Second Circuit, which affirmed
the district court decision.4 2 In the interim, Zapata filed an interlocutory appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court.4' The Court of
Chancery dismissed the shareholder's cause of action in light of the
court of appeals' decision." The order of the Second Circuit was
then stayed pending the Delaware Supreme Court's resolution of
Zapata's appeal from the Court of Chancery. 5
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court's
decision that a shareholder possesses an independent individual right
to continue a shareholder's derivative suit notwithstanding the corporation's objection to the suit."1 The court further ruled that the
shareholder has a right to initiate the lawsuit but does not have an
47
absolute right to control the suit.
37. Id. at 1255.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1262. This holding by the Court of Chancery was reversed by the Delaware
Supreme Court.
41. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff/d, 597 F.2d 789 (2d
Cir. 1980).
42. Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1980).
43. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
44. id. at 781.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 782.
47. Id. at 783. The court cited Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 141 A. 277 (1927),
which held that "a stockholder may sue in his own for the purpose of enforcing corporate
rights ...in a proper case if the corporation on the demand of the stockholder refuses to
bring suit." Id. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Chancery had misinterpreted the meaning of Sohland.

In addressing the issue of whether the independent litigation
committee has the power to dismiss an action brought by a shareholder, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled:
[Ilt must be clear that an independent committee possesses the
corporation's power to seek the termination of a derivative suit.
Section 141 (c) allows a board to delegate all of its authority to a
committee. A committee with properly delegated authority
would have the power to move for dismissal or summary judgment if the entire board did.' 8
Further, the court considered whether an independent committee
could retain the power to dismiss a derivative suit even if a majority
of the board was tainted by self-interest:
We do not think that the interest taint of the board majority is
per se a legal bar to the delegation of the board's power to an
independent committee composed of disinterested board members. The committee can properly act for the corporation to
move to dismiss derivative litigation that is believed to be detrimental to the corporation's best interest."'
The court next addressed the power of the independent litigation committee to dismiss shareholder derivative suits. The court recognized that the corporation should have the power to dismiss frivolous suits. But the court also understood that this power should not
be broad enough to allow the corporation to consistently dismiss
bona fide suits, thus rendering shareholder derivative suits
ineffective.50
The court reasoned that the business judgment rule, if applied
at this stage of the litigation, would not provide the proper balance
between the two extremes.5 1 In an attempt to find the proper balance, the court delineated a two-step test to be applied only in demand-excused cases. 52 First, the court should inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting
its conclusion.5" If the court concludes that the committee was not
truly independent, if the committee's conclusions have no reasonable
basis, or if the committee did not satisfy the good faith requirement,
then the court should deny the independent litigation committee's
48.
49.
50.

Zapata, 430 A.2d at 785.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 786-87.

51. Id. at 787.
52. Id. at 788.
53. Id. In addition to having the corporation prove the due care, good faith, and independence of the committee, the court may at its discretion make limited discovery to facilitate
the inquiry into these elements required by the first step.

motion to dismiss."

If the court determines that the first step of the test has been
satisfied, it proceeds to the second step and applies its own business
judgment.5 5 The Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that this second
step is necessary to balance the interests in disposing of frivolous
claims and retaining bona fide claims. 6 The application of the second step is designed to prevent mere compliance with the mechanics,
but not the spirit, of the first test.5 7 The court ruled that if the
court's independent business judgment is satisfied, it may grant the
58
motion to dismiss the shareholder's derivative action.
The burden of proof required in a demand-excused case, such as
Zapata, is contrary to the burden of proof required under the business judgment rule as exemplified by Auerbach. Under the business
judgment rule, the shareholder has the burden of alleging specific
facts which demonstrate that the special litigation committee either
did not act in good faith or did not act independently of the board. 9
In contrast, in a demand-excused case, the burden of proof is on the
party moving for dismissal (usually the corporation)" to show that
the committee did act independently and in good faith.
II1. Federal Decisions
Since the Auerbach and Zapata decisions, several federal
courts 1 have considered the standard of review for scrutinizing the
actions of a special litigation committee. In Stein v. Bailey," a
shareholder made a demand on the board of directors for redress of
an improper stock option plan. 3 The board appointed a special litigation committee to review the shareholder's claim, and after reviewing the claim, the committee recommended dismissal of the
shareholder's suit.14 The shareholder argued that the two-step test
54. Id. at 789.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. Several commentators have criticized Zapata because of its vagueness and ambiguity in applying the test. See Block & Prussin, supra note 3, at 62; Note, A Middle
Ground, supra note 5, at 562; Note, Delaware's JudicialBusiness Judgment Rule, supra note
6, at 210.
58. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788.
59. See supra note 30.

60. Commentators have suggested that the burden of proof required in a demand-excused case is the more feasible of the two alternatives. The basis of their suggestion is that the
board is in possession of the pertinent facts pertaining to the due care, good faith, and independence of the independent litigation committee. Comment, Off the Bench and into the Boardroom: Judicial Business After Zapata, 70 GEO. L.J. 1025, 1041 (1982).
61. See Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa
1981), in which the court applied the Zapata test.
62. Stein v. Bailey, 531 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
63. Id. at 686.
64. Id. at 689.

established in Zapata was the proper standard of review. In rejecting
this argument, the court ruled that the two-step test applies only in
demand-excused cases.66
The case of Abella v. Universal6 presented an issue of first impression in Virginia to determine the authority of a special litigation
committee to terminate a shareholder's derivative suit and the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny in such a case. 7 The court acknowledged both the Auerbach and the Zapata tests and rejected
Auerbach as too narrow. The court then inquired whether Virginia
corporate law was comparable to Delaware corporate law and found
them to be substantially similar. Persuaded by the Delaware Supreme Court's reasoning in balancing the competing interests, the
court applied the Zapata test68 on the following rationale:
The Delaware Supreme Court showed its sensitivity to the danger of giving minority shareholders the power to embroil the corporation in ill-founded litigation pursuant to the minority rule,
as well as the danger of allowing the board of directors to appoint a few 'good ol' boys' as a special litigation committee and
to be accordingly white-washed pursuant to the majority rule.
While the court recognizes the limitations of its own expertise in
applying its business judgment to the decision as to dismissal, it
also recognizes the relative ease with which a committee could
construct a record of apparent diligent investigation after having
pre-determined the outcome of the investigation. The court is
persuaded that the Zapata approach adequately safeguards the
competing interests at stake and that Virginia has no need for,
nor would it follow a more restrictive approach."
The more restrictive approach mentioned by the court is presumably
a reference to the Auerbach decision, which limits the court's inquiry
to only the good faith and independence of the board and precludes
inquiry into the correctness of its decision.
65. Id. at 692. The court distinguished between demand-excused and demand-refused
cases, noting that in a demand-excused case, a shareholder acquires the legal ability to initiate
a derivative suit, but in a demand-refused case, a shareholder never actually acquires the legal
ability to sue. Moreover, the fact that demand has been excused is alone indicative of the
legitimacy of the shareholder's claim. Thus, a court is in a more precarious position when it is
asked to dismiss a shareholder's suit which has been properly commenced, compared to when
it is asked to dismiss a shareholder's suit in which the shareholder was never entitled to initiate
the action. Based on this distinction, the court concluded that less deference is required to the
will of the board of directors in demand-excused cases than in demand-refused cases.
In the instant case, the court correctly held that the standard of judicial review to be
applied in a demand-refused case is the business judgment rule as enunciated in Zapata. See
supra note 52.
66. Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982).
67. Id. at 798.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 799.

The court in Abella found that the plaintiff's demand was properly excused 70 and, therefore, it proceeded to apply the two-step test
of Zapata. The court ruled that the burden of proof was on the corporation, which presented to the court the special litigation committee's record to support the contention that the committee was independent, acted in good faith, and had a reasonable basis for its
findings.7 1 After finding that the corporation had met its burden of
proof, the court applied the second step of Zapata, which requires
the exercise of the court's own business judgments. The court, using
its own business judgment, concluded that the outcome of a suit
against the directors would fail and, therefore, dismissed the
action.72
The court, though holding for the corporation, imposed on the
special litigation committee an additional requirement not required
by Zapata. It ruled that when a shareholder lacks sufficient financial
resources to prosecute the claim, the corporation must contribute the
necessary resources to the shareholder.7 a Thus, Virginia has tipped
the balance in the shareholder's favor.
IV.

Delaware Decisions

The Delaware courts have recently been presented with a number of shareholder derivative suits in which the shareholders sought
to have the Zapata test applied on the basis that their demand on
the board was futile. The Delaware Courts, however, stringently apply the demand requirement of Rule 23.1 to prevent shareholders
from "standard shopping. ' 74 The following decisions illustrate interpretations on the demand requirement in light of Zapata.
70. Id. at 798 n.2.
71. Id. at 800-01. The court found each of the committee members to be independent
of the board and that the fees paid to the members were not contingent upon the outcome of
their decision. In reviewing the good faith requirement, the court looked to the spirit and
sincerity of the committee's investigation. Based on its findings, the court concluded that the
committee had undertaken the project with diligence and impartiality and, most importantly,
that it was objective throughout the investigation.
72. Id. at 802. The court reasoned that it would exercise its own business judgment
only in the area in which it has a degree of expertise: namely, on the issue of whether the
shareholder's suit would succeed.
This court's holding modified the Zapata test, which allows the court to examine the
board's actual decision; here, the court declined to extend its own judgment to that length,
instead limiting it to a litigant's ability to win on the merits.
73. Id. The court stated in dictum:
In some instances a derivative plaintiff shareholder just lacks the resources, determination, or information necessary in order to prosecute a meritorious claim
on behalf of the corporation. In such instances, it might be in the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders for a special litigation committee to decide not only that the corporation should not move to dismiss the action, but that
the corporation should lend its (probably superior) resources to the prosecution
of the action.
74. DEL. CH.CT. R. 23.1, DEL. CODE ANN. Vol. 16 (1974). See also infra notes 84-85
and accompanying text.

In Bergstein v. Texas International Co.,7 the shareholder did
not make a demand on the board of directors before instituting the
suit, so the corporation moved to dismiss the claim for lack of demand.76 In addressing this issue, the court recognized the policy consideration underlying the demand requirement, which is to give the
corporate management an opportunity to do any of the following:
correct any wrong; pursue an alternative course of action; avoid expensive litigation; seek early termination of meritless claims; and
prevent strike suits.7" Moreover, it is contrary to the interests of the
corporation to permit a shareholder's action where demand would
not have been futile.
In an attempt to reconcile the two competing interests, the
Bergstein court established criteria to be used in determining
whether there should have been a demand on the board prior to commencement of the suit. 78 The major factor to be considered is
whether the directors who would have ruled on the demand are alleged to have participated in or approved of the wrongdoing. 9 In
effect, the court's ruling added to Zapata by providing guidelines
which had not previously been delineated.
In another business judgment case, Abbey v. Computer & Communication Technology Corp.,80 a shareholder who had made a demand on the board later argued that such demand was futile and
should have been excused. 8' The corporation, in response to the demand, had appointed a special litigation committee which sought to
stay the action to allow sufficient time for an investigation. In addition, the corporation, on its own, moved to dismiss on the ground
that the shareholder did not possess proper standing. Based on the
corporation's motion, the court noted:
What the board of directors is purporting to do here

. . .

is to

delegate a final corporate decision as to the merits of the suit to
the litigation committee while attempting to reserve the right to
raise technical and procedural defenses to itself. . . . I do not
think that this should be permitted . .. [T]he board should be

required to either fish or cut bait."'
75. 453 A.2d 467 (Del. Ch. 1982).
76. Id. at 468.
77. Id. at 469.
78. Id. at 470.
79. Id. at 473. In deciding that the crucial factor was whether the director approved of
or participated in the alleged wrongdoing, the court relied on Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779
(3d Cir. 1982) and Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 103, 174 A.2d 696 (1961).
80. 457 A.2d 368 (Del. Ch. 1983).
81. Id. at 372. In response to the shareholder's demand on the board of directors, he
was told that action would be delayed until another director (a defendant herein) returned
from vacation. The shareholder successfully argued that demand should be excused because it
would have been futile to wait for the unfavorable response from the directors.
82. Id. at 373-74.

The court concluded that because the corporation took advantage of
the Zapata decision by appointing a special litigation committee, it
had effectively disqualified itself from controlling the litigation,
thereby excusing the shareholder's demand. 83
The problem of the potential for standard shopping by shareholders was addressed in Kaufmann v. Beal.8 ' The court recognized
the problem as follows:
Considerations of strategy since Zapata Corporationv. Maldonado have encouraged plaintiffs in stockholder derivative suits to
sometimes file suit without making a prior demand because they
perceive that there is now a different standard for judicial review of a decision of a Board of Directors in refusing to initiate
a suit after demand than there is of a decision of a Board in
terminating an already filed action.88
The court stressed the importance of the demand requirement
by ruling that if no demand is made by the shareholder, then he
must bear the burden of proving that the demand would have been
futile. 6 Based on the court's ruling, standard shopping will not be
tolerated, and if a shareholder attempts to standard shop and fails to
meet his burden of proof, the court will dismiss the action. This rule
applies even though the shareholder may have had an otherwise meritorious claim against the board of directors.87
In Pompeo v. Hefner,88 the court was presented with two new
issues concerning the ramifications of Zapata. First, the court considered the situation in which a shareholder objects to the special
litigation committee's purported independence. Second, the court addressed the shareholder's discovery rights when the special litigation
committee is currently conducting its own investigation. In Pompeo,
the corporation's majority shareholder appointed a one member special litigation committee.8 9 The shareholder objected to the committee's independence on the ground that the member could not have
been elected as a director without the vote of the majority shareholder, which thus raised an inference that the committee was indebted to the majority shareholder. 90 In addressing the first issue,
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 374.
Kaufman v. Beal, No. 6485, slip op. (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1983).
Id. at 6.
Id.

87. Id. at 7.
88.

Pompeo v. Hefner, No. 6806, slip op. (Del. Ch. Mar. 14, 1983).

89. Id. at 2.
90. Id. at 3. The shareholder objected to the independence of the committee because
the one member committee held his appointment subject to the whim of the majority shareholder. The shareholder argued that therefore the committee was tainted with the same selfinterest that permeated the majority shareholder.

the court ruled that the shareholder's challenge to the special litigation committee's independence was premature and that a contrary
holding would result in a denial of the corporation's use of a special
litigation committee as allowed by Zapata.91 Under Zapata, the independence of the special litigation committee has no critical significance until the committee files a motion to dismiss the shareholder's
cause of action.9 2 Thus, the Pompeo court concluded that a challenge to the committee's independence may be raised only when a
petition for dismissal has been filed. At such time, the court will
apply the first step of Zapata, inquiring into the independence of the
committee, its good faith, and the reasonableness of its findings.93
The second issue, whether to allow the shareholder to make discovery pending the investigation of the committee, or to participate
in the investigation of the committee, was addressed in Abbey v.
Computer & Communications Technology.94 The Abbey court construed Zapata to mean that the shareholder's right to make discovery must be held in abeyance in deference to the board of directors'
power to control the fortunes of the corporation. 5 The Pompeo court
had reasoned that the special litigation committee has a priority over
the shareholder because it has the power of the board of directors."
Therefore, the Abbey court held that the shareholder had no right to
intermeddle, or act coextensively, with the special litigation committee during its investigation.97
The shareholder in Richardson v. Graves" relied on Abbey v.
Computer & Communications Technology99 to contend that the demand requirement was excused. The court distinguished Abbey by
noting that in Abbey the corporation appointed a special litigation
committee upon receiving the shareholder's demand and that the
corporation, not the special litigation committee, then filed a motion
to dismiss.' In Richardson, however, the corporation filed a motion
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id. at 4.
93. Id. The court, in relying upon Zapata, rejected the shareholder's argument that a
determination of the committee's independence should be presently made to avoid undue delay
while a possibly unqualified committee investigated the facts. The court ruled that Zapata had
established that the time for testing the committee's independence was when the committee
moved for a dismissal, and not beforehand, because the issue would be moot if the committee
were to uphold the shareholder's claim and not move for a dismissal.
94. Id. at 6.
95. Id.
96. The court's conclusion is further supported by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)
(1974), which permits a board of directors to designate a special litigation committee having

the same powers as that held by the board of directors.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Pompeo, No. 6806, slip op. at 7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 14, 1983).
Richardson v. Graves, No. 6617, slip op. (Del, Ch. June 17, 1983).
457 A.2d 368 (Del. Ch. 1983).
Richardson, No. 6617, slip op. at 11 (Del. Ch. June 17, 1983).

to dismiss first and then appointed a special litigation committee. 101
In view of the difference in the progression of procedural events, the
court ruled that the corporation's motion to dismiss did not amount
10 2
to a waiver of the demand requirement.
Under the Zapata standard, a special litigation committee, in
its motion to dismiss, is required to submit a thorough written record
of the investigation and its findings and recommendations.10 3 This
full disclosure requirement was addressed in Kaplan v. Wyatt. 104 In
Kaplan, the special litigation committee, after filing its investigation
record, sought a protective order against public disclosure of certain
information contained in its report.10 5 The court examined the circumstances under which it is appropriate to honor such a request.
The shareholder, in arguing for full disclosure, relied on Joy v.
North,1 0 1 which held that the information used by the special litigation committee in arriving at its decision to dismiss a shareholder's
derivative suit should not be withheld from the public.107 The
Kaplan court distinguished Joy and ruled that it is permissible to
place material under seal at the discovery stage but that such action
is inappropriate at the adjudication stage.108 The court reasoned that
an adjudication is a formal act of government, the basis of which
should, absent exceptional circumstances, be subject to public scrutiny.10 9 The corporation's motion for a protective order was granted
because the parties were at the discovery stage.110
As noted previously, the federal courts have opted for the
Zapata test rather than the Auerbach test. They have deferred to
the Zapata standard to preserve the shareholder's derivative action
out of a concern that the business judgment rule precludes the intracorporate remedy. In the Delaware courts, however, the use of
Zapata has been restricted by ensuring that demand by the shareholder is excused upon proper grounds. The Delaware Courts, therefore, have limited the application of Zapata by requiring strict compliance with the demand requirement, while the federal courts'
leniency regarding the demand requirement has enabled them to apply Zapata more frequently.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981).
Kaplan v. Wyatt, No. 6361, slip op. (Del. Ch. July 23, 1983).
Id. at 1.
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V.

Commentaries

The two-step test established by Zapata, which differs from the
traditional business judgment rule, has been an ongoing subject of

controversy. There are several primary areas of dispute: first, the
repercussions of departing from the business judgment rule and allowing the court to review the special litigation committee's decision;"' second, the guidelines to be applied when the court exercises

its independent business judgment;' 12 and third, the requirement that
demand be excused before the Zapata test can be applied." 3
The business judgment rule, which traditionally does not allow
the court to review the substance of a corporate board's decisions,
has been modified by Zapata to allow the court to scrutinize the

board's decision by using its own independent business judgment. It
has been argued that judicial scrutiny of the decision to dismiss a
shareholder's derivative suit will make judicial proceedings unneces-

sarily lengthy and complicated with the result of unduly burdening
the corporation.114 Another response to the departure from the business judgment rule has been the suggestion that a middle ground
approach should be applied with the standard of review somewhere
between the standards set forth in Auerbach and Zapata." 5

The weaknesses in these contentions are exposed in light of the
Zapata court's reasoning that the objective of its decision was to

strike a proper balance between the interests of the corporation and
the shareholder. The foundation of the court's ruling is evidenced by
the following statement:
At the risk of stating the obvious, the problem is relatively simple. If, on the one hand, corporations can consistently wrest
bona fide derivative action away from well-meaning derivative
plaintiffs through the use of the committee mechanism, the derivative suit will lose much, if not all, of its generally recognized
11.

Block v. Prussin, supra note 3.

112.

Note, Delaware's Judicial Business Judgment Rule, supra note 6.

113. Block, Prussin & Wachtel, Dismissal of Derivative Actions Under the Business
Judgment Rule: Zapata One Year Later, 38 Bus. LAw 401 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Block,
Prussin & Wachtel].
114. Block & Prussin, supra note 3, at 58, 62. The authors contend that Zapata is too
open-ended to allow an expeditious decision. In support of this position, the authors assert:
The test invites endless open-ended pre-trial proceedings into such elusive issues
as: whether the board's action satisfied the spirit of step one; whether termination would be 'premature' because the motion is 'deserving of further consideration;' whether the corporation's interest is 'compelling'; whether the derivative
action is 'non-frivolous' and whether 'matters of law and public policy' outweigh
the corporate interest.
See Note, Delaware's JudicialBusiness Judgment Rule, supra note 6, at 210; Note, Corporations - The Business Judgment Rule - The Zapata Modification, 9 N. Ky. L. J. 569, 580
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Corporations].
115. Note, Delaware's Judicial Business Judgment Rule, supra note 6, at 211.

effectiveness as an intra-corporate means of policing boards of
directors. If on the other hand, corporations are unable to rid
themselves of meritless or harmful litigation and strike suits, the
derivative action, created to benefit the corporation, will produce
the opposite, unintended result.11
The Delaware Supreme Court's response in Zapata was reached
in light of Auerbach, which had allowed the corporation too much
power at the expense of shareholder interests, and which had allowed
no meaningful possibility of judicial review. To protect the right of
the shareholder to bring a derivative suit, the Delaware Supreme
Court permitted the lower courts to use their own business judgment. In the court's attempt to seek equality of justice for both the
shareholder and the corporation, the two-step test was established.
Another criticism of the Zapata decision is that the Delaware
Supreme Court did not provide any guidelines for determining when
the court's independent judgment is warranted under the second
step. 11 7 It has been argued that to achieve a balance that would
eliminate frivolous shareholder derivative suits while checking corporate power to dismiss derivative suits, the Supreme Court of Delaware should have been more explicit in establishing criteria for review.11 8 The Delaware Supreme Court did not establish specific
guidelines because the test's effectiveness depends on the exercise of
the lower court's discretion based on the particular facts and circumstances before it.
Another topic of controversy centers on the procedure for initiating a shareholder derivative suit. If a shareholder brings a suit after imposing a prior demand on the board of directors, the standard
of review is the business judgment rule. If the shareholder does not
make a demand, and if the court excuses the demand requirement,
the standard of review is the Zapata two-step test." 9 The dichotomy
between demand-refused and demand-excused cases has been criti116. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786-87 (Del. 1981).
117. Note, Delaware's Judicial Business Judgment Rule, supra note 6, at 209. The authors suggest that guidelines for determining whether the court should proceed to the second
step should include: the ratio of interested to "disinterested" directors; who selected the independent committee; whether the committee is comprised of inside directors or recently appointed directors; and whether the directors will be retained after termination of the suit.
118. Note, A Middle Ground, supra note 5, at 561. The author notes the following
language, "[l]f the Court is not satisfied for other reasons relating to the process ., ."and
criticized the Court for not delineating these "other reasons." Consequently, the author contends the courts will confine themselves to the traditional areas of good faith, independence,
and reasonableness of the investigation, thereby failing to explore other possible areas. Thus,
the first step will be limited to the traditional business judgment rule.
The author further argues that the second step of the test will be weakened by allowing
the court discretion whether to exercise its independent business judgment. Rather, this step
should be made mandatory upon the court.
i19. Block, Prussin & Wachtel, supra note 113, at 407.

cized for the following reasons: demand is discouraged; another layer
is added to an already complex procedure; doubt is added in an area
that is already uncertain; and different application of the Zapata
test result.1 10 The problem of possible standard shopping is restricted
by the Delaware courts' requirement of strict compliance with the
demand prerequisite; opportunities for standard shopping in the federal courts persist, however, because of the leniency in enforcing the
demand requirement.121
Another illustration of the controversy concerning Zapata can
be found in the following arguments. Two authors have argued that
Zapata goes too far in favor of the shareholder by shifting the burden of proof to the corporation. 2 In support of their contention,
they stated that even when the corporation has met its burden by
proving due care, good faith, and reasonableness, its claim can still
be defeated under the second step of the Zapata test, if the court, in
exercising its own business judgment, decides that nevertheless the
decision by the board turned out to be the incorrect one. 2 ' They
further contended that the Zapata rule defeats the purpose of the
business judgment rule by not allowing a court to scrutinize the
judgment of the board. The authors concluded, therefore, that the
Zapata decision has given too much power to the shareholder and
has deprived the corporation of its ability to control internal corpo24
rate affairs without judicial interference.
In contrast, it also has been contended that the transfer of the
burden of proof from the shareholder to the corporation is justified
on the basis of the corporation's access to relevant information.
Although the advocate of this position criticized the Delaware Supreme Court for its failure to establish guidelines on how to satisfy
this burden of proof, he supported the standard of judicial scrutiny
to be administered in balancing the parties' interests."'
Another criticism is that the Delaware Supreme Court has
seized the power from the special litigation committee in the second
step of Zapata.2 7 The effect of the decision is to substitute public
120. Id. at 413.14.
121. Id. at 414.
122. Block & Prussin, supra note 3, at 63.
123. Id.
124. Id. See Note, Business Judgment of Shareholder DerivativeSuits by Board Litigation Committees" An Expanded Role for the Courts, 35 VAND. L. REv. 235 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, An Expanded Role for the Courts].
125. Id.
126. Id. at 259, 262. The author further contends that the second step of the Zapata

test is unnecessary because the first step adequately protects the shareholder's interest.
127. Brown, Shareholder Litigation and the Special Litigation Committee, 53 U. PITT.
L. REV. 601, 643 (1982). See Note, Corporation,supra note 114, wherein the author maintains that the Delaware Supreme Court judicially amended Delaware corporation law, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 A (1974), by removing the ultimate power from the director's corn-

decision making by a court for private decision making by directors
based on the court's exercise of its own business judgment. 128 In
Zapata, the court did not define its public decision making power
and, therefore, it provided no assurance that the power
would be ex129
ercised in a consistent and nonarbitrary manner.
On the other hand, Zapata has been commended for the assurance it provided to the meaningful survival of shareholder derivative
suits,1 80 in contrast to Auerbach, which allows the corporation to effectively wrest power from the shareholder who initiates a derivative
suit. In support of this conclusion, it should be noted that under the
first step of the Zapata test, the court inquires into the bases supporting the committee's decision and not merely into the proceedings
used to arrive at its conclusion as was prescribed by Auerbach. The
first step of the Zapata test, therefore, accrues to the shareholder's
benefit by providing him assurance of maintaining the derivative
suit.' ' The second step of the Zapata test, however, permits the
court to readily dispose of frivolous derivative suits by exercising its
own business judgment, whereas no such independent judgment is
available under Auerbach. Thus, the second step inures to the corporation's benefit.'3 2 The Delaware Supreme Court achieved an equilibrium and balanced the opposing interests of the shareholder and
the corporation by promulgating a two-step test that protects meritorious claims but allows dismissal of frivolous suits.'
V.

Conclusion

The development of the business judgment rule as it has been
traditionally applied is exemplified in the Auerbach decision. In this
decision, the New York Court of Appeals unequivocally gave to corporations unrestricted liberty over corporate affairs without interference from its shareholders or the courts. The court reasoned that the
corporate entity, being the most qualified to make its own decisions,
should not be subject to judicial scrutiny. The Auerbach court was
the first court to rule that an independent litigation committee has
the power to terminate a shareholder derivative suit, a conclusion
which effectively eliminated this intra-corporate remedy.
In Zapata, the Delaware Supreme Court decided to re-examine
the business judgment rule in light of the repercussions emanating
mittee and giving this power to the courts.
128. Brown, supra note 127, at 643.
129. Id. at 643-44.
130. Comment, Limits on the Power of Directors to Terminate ShareholderLitigation:
The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 786 (1981).
131. Id. at 799.
132. Id. at 802.
133. Id. at 806.

from Auerbach.'" In an attempt to remedy the apparent defect in
Auerbach, the court developed a mechanism that would provide the
proper balance between the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.
To achieve this balance, the court delineated a two-step test.
The first step involves a procedural change from the Auerbach approach, whereby the corporation has the burden of proving due care,
good faith, and independence. A further change under this step was
the expansion of the court's power to inquire into the reasons for the
special litigation committee's decision.
The second step allows the court to exercise its own business
judgment in determining whether the corporation has complied with
the "spirit" of the first step instead of merely fulfilling "the letter of
the law." Thus, even if the corporation has complied with the first
step, the court may still deny the corporation's motion based on its
own independent judgment. The second step contains the most radical departure from the business judgment rule and is the most important aspect of the test because it is neutral in its application and
is the basis for achieving a balance of interests of the shareholder
and the corporation.
The Delaware Supreme Court, by promulgating the two-step
Zapata test, established a practical method which provides both the
shareholder and the corporation with an equal representation of their
respective interests. Moreover, it ensured the continuation of an effective intra-corporate resolution of shareholder derivative suits.

134. It should be noted that there is a major procedural difference between the two
cases. In Auerbach, the shareholder made a demand on the board of directors, whereas, in
Zapata, the shareholder's demand was excused. The Zapata court held that the two-step test
applies only in demand-excused cases. However, the business judgment rule is the appropriate
standard of review in demand-refused cases.

